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lNTRODUCI10N 
"The problem of juvenile delinquency must be dealt with in an ef­
fective and meaningful manner if we are to reduce the ever increasing 
levels of crime and improve the quality of life in America."1 With 
these words, the United States Senate opened its report in support of 
the first major federal juvenile delinquency statute in almost forty 
years.2 The goal of the statute and of federal involvement in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings was to give the highest attention to prevent-
1. S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5285. 
2. See S. REP. No. 93-1011 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5284. 
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ing juvenile crime and to minimizing the involvement of juveniles in 
the juvenile and criminal justice systems.3 
Until 1974, the federal government played a relatively minor role 
in the juvenile delinquency system. In that year, Congress, in accor­
dance with a general trend toward federalizing crime, greatly ex­
panded the jurisdiction of the federal government over juvenile 
crime.4 Historically, crime, and particularly juvenile crime, was the re­
sponsibility of state governments with very little involvement by the 
federal government.5 In fact, the only major statute that dealt with ju­
venile crime was the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938 
("FJDA").6 The FIDA offered the United States Attorney General 
discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a juvenile under the age of 
eighteen who had not been surrendered to state officials or had been 
charged with offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death.7 The 
federal government rarely employed this statute, and therefore federal 
involvement in juvenile delinquency proceedings remained virtually 
nonexistent until 1974. In that year, Congress passed the Juvenile Jus­
tice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 ("JJDPA")8 because it 
felt that federal intervention was necessary to stem rising juvenile 
crime rates, specifically, violent juvenile crime.9 
Congress's enactment of the JJDP A was also motivated in part by 
the haphazard way in which the federal government had previously 
been attempting to alleviate the problem of juvenile delinquency. The 
Senate, in 1974, stated that there was "[l]ittle coherent national plan­
ning or established priority structure among the major programs 
dealing with the problems of youth development and delinquency pre­
vention . . . . The present array of programs demonstrates the lack of 
priorities, emphasis and direction in the Federal Government's efforts 
to combat delinquency."10 
3. See S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5285. 
4. Since 1970, Congress has created over forty percent of what comprises the current 
federal criminal code. See Task Force on the Federalization of Criminal Law, American Bar 
Association, Criminal Justice Section, The Federalization of Criminal Law 7 (1998) (visited 
Dec. 21, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/fedreport.html> [hereinafter ABA Report]. 
5. See NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL INmATIVES, 
1960-1993, at 8 (1994). 
6. See Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-666, §§ 1-9, 52 Stat. 
764, 764-66 (1938) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031-5042 (West Supp. 1998)). 
7. See §§ 1-9, 52 Stat. at 764-66. 
8. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (1974), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998). 
9. See S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 7 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5285-86. 
As stated in the Senate Report, "fi]uveniles under 18 are responsible for 51 percent of the 
total arrests for property crimes, 23 percent for violent crimes, and 45 percent for all serious 
crimes." Id. 
10. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5290 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-220 (1971)). 
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The JJDPA drastically changed federal involvement in the field of 
juvenile delinquency. Congress created a broad federal approach that 
addressed both treatment and prosecution of juvenile offenders. The 
major focus of the legislation was to provide funding for research and 
programs to assist the states in their efforts to address the delinquency 
problem.11 In addition to these programs, Congress vastly expanded 
the basis for assuming federal jurisdiction over juvenile offenders.12 
As currently amended,13 the JJDPA provides for prosecution of a ju­
venile in federal court when: 
[T]he Attorney General,14 after investigation, certifies to the appropriate 
district court of the United States that (1) the juvenile court or other ap­
propriate court of a State does not have jurisdiction or refuses to assume 
jurisdiction over said juvenile . . . , (2) the State does not have available 
programs and services adequate for the needs of juveniles, or (3) the of­
fense charged is a crime of violence that is a felony or [one of a specified 
number of drug or gang-related crimes], and that there is a substantial 
Federal interest in the case or the offense to warrant the exercise of Fed­
eral jurisdiction.15 
Accordingly, a United States Attorney who desires to proceed 
against a juvenile in federal court must certify the existence of one of 
the three factors listed above and that a substantial federal interest 
exists in the prosecution.16 In practice, this requirement is often met 
by a certification simply stating that these elements exist, without fur­
ther explanation or support.17 
11. See infra notes 67-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the JJDP A. 
12. The change from the FIDA to the JIDPA was significant because Congress created 
precise procedural guidelines for trying juveniles in federal court that did not exist under the 
FIDA. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032. Accordingly, these changes provided the United States with 
the means to assume federal jurisdiction over juvenile offenders. Furthermore, the JIDPA, 
as will be seen in the remainder of this Note, devoted substantial federal resources to the 
problem of juvenile delinquency. See Section I.A. 
13. Congress made significant amendments to the JIDPA in 1984, see Pub. L. No. 98-
473, § 1201 (adding the "substantial Federal interest" requirement, lowering the transfer age 
to fifteen, and expanding jurisdiction by adding additional crimes), and in 1988, see Pub. L. 
No. 100-690, § 6467(a) (significantly expanding federal jurisdiction). 
14. "Under the authorization found in 28 C.F.R. § 0.57, the Attorney General has dele­
gated her certification and transfer authority to the United States Attorneys." United States 
v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1317 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996). 
15. 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (citations omitted). 
16. There is a separate split in the federal circuits over whether the "substantial federal 
interest" prong is required in all certifications or just for certifications involving a crime of 
violence. This issue is beyond the scope of this Note and not relevant to the determination 
of the issue that it addresses. This Note will argue that courts should review the certification 
whenever the substantial federal interest must be asserted, regardless of how often this oc­
curs. For a general discussion of this issue, see United States v. Juvenile #1, 118 F.3d 298, 303 
n.6 (5th Cir. 1997). 
17. A typical certification would include the following information: that there was "a 
substantial federal interest in the case and the offenses warrant[ed] the exercise of Federal 
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In response to the federalization of juvenile delinquency and the 
increasing focus on federal jurisdiction, some juveniles have ques­
tioned whether a substantial federal interest exists in their case and 
have sought judicial review of the prosecutor's certification.18 The cir­
cuit courts are split over the appropriateness of judicial review in this 
context. The Fourth Circuit has held that the certification should be 
reviewable by courts.19 In so holding, it relied on the legislative history 
of the JJDPA, which stresses the importance of states' control over ju­
venile delinquency, and Supreme Court precedent stating that certain 
certifications regarding jurisdiction over juveniles made by prosecu­
tors should be subject to judicial review.20 Many circuits, however, 
have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit's approach.21 With slight varia­
tion, these courts have argued that the plain language of the JJDPA 
precludes judicial review.22 Furthermore, their holdings state that 
when the certification is based upon a judgment call by a prosecutor, 
the certification belongs to a category of unreviewable prosecutorial 
decisions.23 
The Supreme Court established the ability of a lower court to sub­
stantively review a certification by a federal prosecutor in Gutierrez de 
Martinez v. Lamagno.24 The Fourth Circuit relied on this case in 
United States v. Juvenile Male #125 to permit review of a federal prose­
cutor's certification under the JJDP A. In Gutierrez de Martinez, the 
jurisdiction." United States v. Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d 905, 906 (8th Cir. 1998) (quot­
ing from the Certification to Proceed under the JJDPA) {alterations in original). 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519 {7th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Juvenile Male J.A.J., 134 F.3d at 908. 
19. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1314. 
20. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1314. 
21. See Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 541 {holding that "courts cannot review the substantive basis 
of the Attorney General's certification of a 'substantial federal interest' "); United States v. 
Juvenile Male J.AJ., 134 F.3d at 908; United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 304 {5th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. I.D.P., 102 F.3d 507, 511 {11th Cir. 1996) (holding that "[i]n the 
absence of purely formal error on the face of the certification or proof of bad faith on the 
part of the government .. . certifications made in accord with section 5032 customarily 'must 
be accepted as final'"); United States v. Doe, 49 F.3d 859, 866-67 {2d Cir. 1995) (permitting 
judicial review of whether the offense charged met the statutory requirements of the 
JJDPA); United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378, 1380 {2d Cir. 1975). 
22 See supra note 21. Despite claims by some courts that the JJDPA precludes substan­
tive review of the certification, all of the circuits are in agreement that courts do have the 
authority to review the certification for technical compliance with the requirements of the 
JJDPA. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 10 F.3d 1374, 1396 {9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing the 
age of the juvenile and its application to the statute's requirements for prosecution); United 
States v. Cuomo, 525 F.2d 1285, 1287-89 {5th Cir. 1976) (ensuring that the certifying party 
was the proper one and that the certification was timely). 
23. See, e.g., Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 539-40; United States v. C.G., 736 F.2d 1474, 1478 {11th 
Cir. 1984). · 
24. 515 U.S. 417 {1995). 
25. 86 F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996). 
February 2000] JJD PA and Judicial Review 1011 
Supreme Court upheld review of a prosecutor's certification under the 
Westfall Act that a federal employee was acting in the "scope-of­
employment. "26 In Westfall Act certifications, the prosecutor certifies 
that a federal government employee was acting in the scope of his or 
her employment when an incident, usually a tort, occurred.27 Once the 
certification is made, the United States is substituted as the defendant 
in the litigation.28 In Gutierrez de Martinez, the Court first noted that 
because "federal judges traditionally proceed from the 'strong pre­
sumption that Congress intends judicial review,' "29 review will not be 
precluded unless there is a "persuasive reason to believe that such was 
the purpose of Congress. "30 
Based upon this presumption, the Gutierrez de Martinez Court re­
lied on three primary elements of the Westfall Act in permitting re­
view. First, the Court examined the statutory language and concluded 
that Congress made no mention of a court's inability to review a 
prosecutor's certification.31 Second, the Court found it significant that 
the legislative history of the Westfall Act showed that Congress did 
not "commit . . . 'scope-of-employment' [decisions] . . . to the unre­
viewable judgment of the Attorney General."32 Based on these textual 
examinations, the Court held that it did not find any persuasive basis 
"discernible from the statutory fog" to conclude that Congress in­
tended to restrict judicial review.33 Instead, the Court found just the 
opposite - that evidence existed indicating Congress may have fa­
vored review.34 The third element in the Court's consideration in­
volved important policy considerations that militated against preclud­
ing review. The Court found that the United States has a strong 
financial incentive in the certification of the employee as acting within 
the scope of his employment.35 Additionally, the substitution of the 
United States for the employee defendant upon certification under the 
Westfall Act could result in the dismissal of the suit by the court under 
sovereign immunity principles.36 The Court concluded that the com-
26. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995). 
27. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(d)(l) (West Supp. 1994). 
28. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679( d)(l). 
29. Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 424 (citing cases). 
30. 515 U.S. at 424 (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)) (empha-
sis added). 
31. See 515 U.S. at 430-34. 
32. 515 U.S. at 426. 
33. 515 U.S. at 425. 
34. See 515 U.S. at 431. 
35. See 515 U.S. at 427. 
36. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, there is an exception for acts that occur in a 
foreign country. In Gutierrez de Martinez, the incident in question occurred in Colombia, 
and therefore the Federal Tort Oaims Act did not apply. See 515 U.S. at 420. 
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bination of these two policy considerations and the lack of a statutory 
bar to judicial review supported the notion that Congress did not in­
tend to preclude judicial review of the prosecutor's certification.37 
Thus, the Court held that review of the certification should be permit­
ted. 
Following the Gutierrez de Martinez framework, this Note argues 
that the review of certifications under the JJDP A should be permitted. 
In the limited area of juvenile delinquency law, traditional notions of 
prosecutorial discretion should yield to the unique circumstances sur­
rounding the prosecution of children. Children should not be treated 
as if they are simply young adults. They have unique needs and re­
quire special treatment by the legal system.33 As a result, courts 
should scrupulously review the certification for compliance with terms 
of the JJDP A to ensure that federal jurisdiction is assumed only when 
a substantial federal interest exists.39 Part I of this Note analyzes the 
plain language and legislative history of the JJDPA to show that 
Congress intended to limit the bases for federal jurisdiction and to 
provide for judicial review over certification of juvenile cases to fed­
eral courts. Part II argues that the policy of federal abstention and the 
law's special treatment of children support judicial review of certifica­
tions in the juvenile delinquency arena. The historical difference in 
treatment of juvenile offenders is sufficient to overcome the tradi­
tional deference given to prosecutorial decisionmaking. Courts should 
review the certifications providing for federal jurisdiction over a child 
to ensure that a substantial federal interest is present in the prosecu­
tion of a child in the federal courts. 
I. ANALYZING THE JJDPA: THE PLAIN LANGUAGE 
AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE JJDPA 
SUPPORT JUDICIAL REVIEW 
In enacting the JJDPA and its subsequent amendments, Congress 
has gradually expanded the bases for federal jurisdiction over juvenile 
delinquency.40 At the same time, Congress has retained substantive 
limitations on federal jurisdiction.41 These jurisdictional limitations 
37. See 515 U.S. at 424-26. 
38. See ABA CENTER ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW, A JUDGE'S GUIDE TO IMPROVING 
LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN xiii (1998) (Foreword by Judge (Retired) Thomas 
Hornsby). 
39. Traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion would either categorically prohibit 
judicial review or would limit challenges to substantive compliance, such as if the crime 
committed is in fact a felony. 
40. For a discussion of the amendments to the JJDPA, see supra note 13. 
41. For a list of the statutory requirements for certification, see supra text accompanying 
note 15. 
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must be viewed in light of the history and philosophy of the JJDP A. 
When federal jurisdiction is sought, it becomes clear that judicial re­
view of prosecutorial certifications, to ensure that juveniles are tried in 
the most appropriate forum, is a central component of federal in­
volvement in the juvenile delinquency system. 
In order to determine whether Congress intended to preclude judi­
cial review, courts review the plain language and legislative history of 
statutes.42 The Court has found judicial review to be precluded either 
when Congress has expressly barred review or when a statute provides 
no meaningful standards to guide judicial review.43 Section I.A argues 
that the plain language of the statute exhibits no congressional intent 
to preclude judicial review. Section I.B analyzes the legislative history 
to show that Congress stressed the importance of state control of ju­
venile delinquency· proceedings. This Part argues that Congress es­
tablished standards for judicial review of the prosecutor's certification 
to effectuate this policy of federal abstention. 
A. The Plain Language of the Statute Demonstrates No Congressional 
Intent to Preclude Judicial Review 
The plain language of the JJDP A does not preclude judicial review 
of the prosecutor's certification.44 In the section of the JJDPA dis­
cussing the certification procedure, there is no mention of a court's re­
view of a prosecutor's certification.45 While some courts have pointed 
to the lack of specific authorization of judicial review in the JJDP A as 
indication of a congressional intent to prevent review,46 the failure of 
Congress to mention judicial review, standing alone, does not bar such 
oversight.47 In Gutierrez de Martinez, the Court noted that the 
Westfall Act itself made no direct mention of the standards for courts 
to conduct review of the prosecutor's certification.48 Yet although the 
Supreme Court found that Congress did not clearly address the pre-
42 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 21. In each of these cases, the courts examined the 
text of the JJDP A and the legislative history to determine if judicial review was precluded. 
43. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1988) (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 
U.S. 821, 830 (1985)). 
44. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998). 
45. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032; see also United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 304 
(5th Cir. 1997). 
46. See supra note 21 (listing cases). 
47. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1319 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing 
the Gutie"ez de Martinez case). 
48. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagna, 515 U.S. 417, 424 (1995) ("Congress did not 
address the precise issue unambiguously, if at all."). 
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cise issue, it held that courts have the authority and the ability to re­
view substantively the prosecutor's certification under the Act.49 
Some courts have distinguished the absence of preclusion language 
in the JJDPA from the Westfall Act because the section of the JJDPA 
that describes the transfer provision50 contains standards by which a 
court can determine if the transfer of a juvenile to criminal court is in 
the interest of justice.51 Some courts have argued that the inclusion of 
standards in one section of the statute (the transfer provision) and not 
in another (the certification provision) demonstrates that Congress 
knew how to craft these standards if it desired to do so. 52 Therefore, 
Congress can be assumed to have purposefully excluded the standards 
from the other section.53 
Although this construction may create a presumption that 
Congress intended to exclude review of the certification, it is insuffi­
cient to overcome the Gutierrez de Martinez Court's rationale for ju­
dicial review.54 The review of the prosecutor's certification is critical 
to the court's traditional constitutional role of protecting the citizenry 
from arbitrary and unconstitutional actions by other coordinate 
branches of government.ss Without the oversight role of the courts, 
the judicial branch would be relegated to the "rubber-stamp work" of 
making decisions in cases based entirely upon actions of the Executive 
Branch.s6 The mission of the courts and the process of judicial delib­
eration is not consistent with this type of "mechanical judgment. "s7 
49. See Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 436-37. 
50. The transfer provision permits the courts to transfer a juvenile from juvenile to adult 
status. Section 5032 discusses both the certification procedure, which establishes federal ju­
risdiction, and the transfer procedure. The transfer provision explicitly provides for judicial 
review: "Evidence of the following factors shall be considered, and findings with regard to 
each factor shall be made in the record, in assessing whether a transfer would be in the inter­
est of justice." 18 U.S. C.A. § 5032. 
51. The statute lists the following such factors: "the age and social background of the 
juvenile; the nature of the alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile's prior de­
linquency record; the juvenile's present intellectual development and psychological maturity; 
the nature of past treatment efforts and the juvenile's response to such efforts; the availabil­
ity of programs designed to treat the juvenile's behavioral problems." 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032, 
52 See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 1997). 
53. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male J.AJ., 134 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 1998) (ap­
plying Supreme Court precedent from Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983), which 
states that "[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts inten­
tionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion" (emphasis added)); see also 
United States v. Juvenile No. 1, 118 F.3d at 305. 
54. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text. 
55. See Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Crimi· 
nal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1309, 1340-41 (1997). 
56. See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagna, 515 U.S. 417, 426 (1995) ("[It would be] per­
plexing [to see] Article m judges in the role of petty functionaries, persons required to enter 
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The Supreme Court has stated time and again that judicial review 
of executive branch actions "will not be cut off unless there is persua­
sive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress."58 Fed­
eral judges have traditionally proceeded from the "strong presumption 
that Congress intends judicial review" of executive branch actions and 
decisions.59 Therefore, given the Gutierrez de Martinez Court's focus 
upon the failure of Congress to preclude judicial review in the statute 
and the importance of the policy considerations supporting review,60 
the mere presumption of a statutory construction is insufficient to evi­
dence congressional intent to preclude judicial review.61 
B. The Legislative History Highlights the Role of the State in Juvenile 
Delinquency Proceedings 
Although Congress did not address the question of judicial review 
in the text of the statute, the legislative history of the JJDPA evinces 
congressional intent to provide for judicial review of the prosecutor's 
certification. First, it emphasizes the importance of the policy of fed­
eral abstention. Second, the legislative history establishes standards 
by which courts can review the certification to determine if the crime 
at issue implicates the substantial federal interest needed to override 
the policy of federal deference to the states. 
1. Federal Abstention 
The legislative history of the JJDP A includes an exhaustive over­
view of the activities and efforts by states to address the problem of 
juvenile delinquency.62 As was stated by the 1974 drafters and reiter­
ated in the subsequent amendments to the juvenile justice statute, "ju­
venile delinquency matters should generally be handled by the 
States."63 Congress recognized that the certification requirement was 
as a court judgment an executive officer's decision, but stripped of capacity to evaluate inde­
pendently whetller tlle executive's decision is correct."). 
57. See Gutierrez de Martinez, 515 U.S. at 434. 
58. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (citing numerous cases). 
59. Bowen v. :Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986). 
60. For a discussion of tlle policy considerations supporting review in Guiterrez de 
Martinez, see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of tlle corre­
sponding policy arguments supporting judicial review under tlle JJDP A, see infra Section 
Il.B. 
61. The scope of prosecutorial discretion will be discussed infra Section I.B.3. 
62 See S. REP. No. 93-1011 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5283 ("[This] 
bill ... provides for Federal leadership and coordination of tlle resources necessary to de­
velop and implement at tlle State and local community level effective programs for tlle pre­
vention and treatment of juvenile delinquency." (emphasis added)). 
63. S. REP. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3526. 
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intended to limit federal jurisdiction over juveniles.64 While substan­
tive limitations on federal jurisdiction, alone, do not "necessarily im­
plicate a concomitant judicial power to look behind such decision[ s ],"65 
the legislative history shows that Congress intended the court to re­
strict jurisdiction to only those cases that truly merit federal involve­
ment. Thus, Congress chose to abstain from juvenile delinquency 
matters absent the existence of a substantial federal interest.66 
Although the JJDPA establishes a mechanism that increases the 
federal role in the prosecution of juvenile crime, the statute is, first 
and foremost, a funding mechanism authorizing grants to states, local 
governments, and private agencies to coordinate and encourage the 
development of programs designed to address the juvenile delin­
quency problem.67 Congress recognized that federal intervention in 
the juvenile delinquency field was imperative in order to "provide 
needed financial assistance and resources" to help with "a State and 
local problem which must be dealt with by the State and local gov­
ernments."68 Rather than creating a federal infrastructure for the 
prosecution and treatment of juvenile offenders, the JJDPA estab­
lished federal programs that focused primarily on researching the ef­
fectiveness of various delinquency and preventative programs.69 Al­
though the JJDPA established a new program to coordinate juvenile 
delinquency programs operated by the federal government, the pri­
mary purpose of this program was to provide comprehensive national 
leadership for addressing the problems of juvenile delinquency.70 Be­
cause juvenile delinquency efforts involve areas of society that are co-
64. United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86F3d 1314, 1318 (4th Cir.1996). 
65. United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1319. 
66. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. 280, 284 (E.D.Va. 1994) (citing 
United States v. Sechrist, 640 F.2d 81, 84 (7th Cir. 1981), which recognizes that the certifica­
tion process is a part of the general policy of federal abstention). It is important to remem­
ber that prior to the enactment of the JJDP A, Congress had minimal involvement in juvenile 
delinquency prosecutions and that the JJ DP A represented an attempt to include the federal 
government in this field. The policy of abstention recognizes that Congress will not enter 
this particular field unless there is a substantial federal interest. 
67. See S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283. 
68. S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5287. 
69. According to the Department of Justice, over forty percent of these federal pro­
grams are research-related, as opposed to programs that provide treatment to juvenile of­
fenders. See Helen N. Connelly, Juvenile Delinquency Development Statements (visited Oct. 
26, 1998) <http://www.ncjrs.org/ txtfiles/ fs-9524.txt>. 
70. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1298 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C. A.N. 5333, 5333 
("[P]rovide a comprehensive, coordinated approach to ... juvenile delinquency • . . .  "). An­
other primary reason for the Act was to encourage the States to adopt the constitutional 
guarantees that the United States Supreme Court had extended to juveniles in delinquency 
proceedings. These provisions included, for example: the right to an attorney, right to a 
speedy trial, and right to confront witnesses. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 
541 (1966). 
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ordinated by state and local governments, such as "law enforcement, 
education, [and] recreation,"71 Congress recognized that community 
resources and state and local organizations are critical in dealing with 
juvenile offenders effectively and humanely.72 In fact, the legislative 
history primarily discusses how congressional action will assist the 
states in improving their own juvenile justice systems.73 It is therefore 
significant to recall that even today, the federal government has no de­
tention facilities to offer services to children adjudicated as delin­
quents in federal district court.74 
Even as Congress expanded the areas of federal jurisdiction into 
drug offenses and serious violent felonies,75 Congress did not eliminate 
the focus upon the idea that the State should exercise primary control 
over juvenile delinquency. Specifically, Congress rejected full adop­
tion of recommendations by the Attorney General's Task Force on 
Violent Crime that would have eliminated the policy of federal ab­
stention and provided federal courts with original jurisdiction over 
federal crimes by juveniles.76 Instead, Congress concluded that the 
policy of federal abstention is an important and beneficial concept that 
should be respected, absent a determination that a substantial federal 
interest is involved.77 Thus, Congress recognized that the state juve­
nile courts were the appropriate place to handle the problem of delin­
quency. 
While subsequent amendments to the 1974 statute have expanded 
the grounds for assumption of jurisdiction by the federal government 
for serious violent felonies,78 the inherent preference for state jurisdic­
tion over delinquency proceedings is still present.79 Congress reiter-
71. S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 65-66 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5286. 
72 See supra note 62. 
73. See S. REP. No. 93-1011 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5283 (finding 
that this Act provides grants to communities and State and local governments who submit 
juvenile delinquency program models that adopt federal guidelines and standards for trying 
juveniles in court). 
74. See Connelly, supra note 69; John Scalia, Juvenile Delinquents in the Federal Crimi­
nal Justice System, February 1997, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, at 3 (Feb. 
1997) <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/jdfcjs.txt>. Because a conviction in juvenile 
court is different from a criminal court conviction, children who are found guilty are deemed 
to have been adjudicated as delinquent. 
75. See Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6467(a) (1988) (codified as amended in 18 U.S.C.A. § 
5032 (West Supp. 1998)). This provision extends federal jurisdiction to crime that involves 
the knowing or intentional manufacture, distribution, or purchase of certain controlled sub­
stances. See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a) (West Supp. 1998). 
76. See S. REP. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529. 
77. See S. REP. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529. 
78. The amendments to the JJDP A in 1984 and 1988 expanded the grounds upon which 
the federal government could assume jurisdiction over juveniles. See supra note 13. 
79. "The essential concepts of the [JJ DPA] are that juvenile delinquency matters should 
generally [be] handled by the States and that criminal prosecution of juvenile offenders 
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ated this preference for state jurisdiction in its 1984 amendments when 
it stated that the prosecution of juvenile off enders should be reserved 
for only those cases involving particularly serious conduct.80 In order 
to define serious conduct and the substantial federal interest concept, 
Congress stated that it intends that: 
[A] determination that there is a "substantial Federal interest" [should] 
be based on a finding that the nature of the offense or the circumstances 
of the case give rise to special Federal concerns. Examples of such cases 
could include an assault on, or assassination of, a Federal official, an air­
craft hijacking, a kidnapping where State boundaries are crossed, a major 
espionage or sabotage offense, participation in large-scale drug traffick­
ing, or significant and willful destruction of property belonging to the 
United States.81 
Thus, federal jurisdiction was intended only for a small subset of cases 
that truly implicate federal interests.82 The certification requirement is 
an integral component of the federal policy of abstention, ensuring 
that only those cases with a substantial federal interest enter the federal 
court system.83 
2. Establishment of Standards 
The enactment of the JJDPA and its subsequent amendments 
comprised a significant expansion of federal involvement in juvenile 
delinquency prosecution. In the 1984 amendments to the JJDP A, 
Congress found it necessary to outline the standards the court system 
should consider in assuming federal jurisdiction over a child and to de­
fine the "substantial federal interest" prong of the JJDP A.84 The 
Supreme Court has stated that judicial review is permitted only where 
should be reserved for only those cases involving particularly serious conduct by older juve­
niles. The committee continues to endorse these concepts .... " United States v. Juvenile 
Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1321 n.9 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting the legislative history from the 1984 
amendment to the JJDPA). 
80. See S. REP. No. 98-225 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C. C.A.N. 3182, 3529, 3531 (reit­
erating the statement of the 1974 Congress that juvenile delinquency matters should be pri­
marily handled by the states). 
81. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 389 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. C.C.A.N. 3182, 3529. 
82. The examples provided in the legislative history are in line with examples cited by 
judicial commentators and scholars who find a need to linrlt federal involvement in juvenile 
crime. See infra Section II.B; see also COMMITIEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, at 22-30 (1995) [hereinafter COMMITIEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING] (recom­
mending that Congress should allocate criminal jurisdiction to the federal courts only under 
linrlted circumstances, such as when the proscribed activity targets the federal government 
itself or involves an international component, a complex enterprise, or widespread state or 
local government corruption). 
83. See COMMITIEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 82, at 22-30. 
84. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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there are meaningful standards to aid a court in its review.85 Accord­
ingly, the courts that have conducted review of the "substantial federal 
interest" prong of a federal prosecutor's certification have followed 
one of two tests: (a) a comparison of the crime committed to the list 
of crimes enumerated in the legislative history of the JJDP A, or (b) a 
review of the legislative history of the criminal statute violated. These 
approaches present workable and manageable standards for review of 
the reasons underlying the government's decision to proceed in fed­
eral court, and thus satisfy the Court's requirements for permitting ju­
dicial review.86 
First, a court can determine if a "substantial federal interest" has 
been implicated by comparing the list of circumstances giving rise to 
special federal concerns in the JJDPA's legislative history to the crime 
allegedly committed by the juvenile. While the list of sample crimes 
noted above is not exhaustive, it provides a useful basis for determin­
ing by analogy whether Congress intended a crime to provide a suffi­
cient basis to assume jurisdiction over a juvenile.87 Courts in the 
Fourth Circuit have found this list to be an integral part of the statu­
tory restrictions that Congress placed upon the assumption of federal 
jurisdiction and to provide meaningful standards for reviewing the cer­
tification to determine if a "substantial federal interest" exists in a 
prosecution.88 As the Fourth Circuit wrote in United States v. NIB, 89 
"[w]hen an offense is listed among the examples in the legislative his­
tory," a court can find that the "substantial federal interest" prong has 
been satisfied.90 A court could also resolve the "substantial federal in­
terest" question by determining if the alleged crime rises to the level 
of the crimes included in the list in the legislative history. For exam­
ple, in United States v. Male Juvenile,91 the federal prosecutor filed a 
certification under the JJDPA alleging that a "single instance of ordi­
nary bank robbery" amounted to a "substantial federal interest."92 In 
rejecting this argument, the court held that this crime is "clearly dif­
ferent in kind from those offenses suggested by the [legislative his-
85. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988) (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 
821, 830 (1985)). 
86. See supra note 85. 
87. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. 280, 283·84 (E.D.Va. 1994). For the 
list of crimes in the legislative history, see supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
88. See United States v. NIB, 104 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Juvenile 
Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. 
Va. 1994). 
89. 104 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 1997) .. 
90. NJB, 104F.3d at 635. 
91. 844 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
92. United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. at 284-85. 
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tory]."93 At this point, the court shifted the burden of proof of compli­
ance with the JJDP A back to the prosecutor to assert some substantial 
allegation of federal concem.94 The court found the prosecutor's justi­
fications to be unpersuasive and accordingly declined jurisdiction.95 If 
this type of certification were permitted, the court held, then the doors 
of the federal court would be open to virtually any violent federal fel­
ony and would "make a mockery of the general policy of [federal] ab­
stention. "96 
A second way that courts can reach the "substantial federal inter­
est" i.J;J.quiry is to review the legislative history of the violated statute to 
determine if the threshold of 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 has been met. For 
example, United States v. Juvenile Male #191 involved an allegation that 
a juvenile had violated the federal carjacking statute.98 The juvenile 
respondent attempted to minhnize the level of federal interest in­
volved by claiming that the theft of an automobile was not a federal 
concem.99 The court then analyzed the legislative history of the car­
jacking statute to determine the intent of Congress in passing the pro­
hibition.100 The court determined that Congress acted with serious 
concern regarding the increase of carjackings, particularly by juve­
niles, and therefore imposed harsh penalties for the violation of the 
Act.101 Ultimately, due to these factors, the court held that there are 
93. 844 F. Supp. at 284. 
94. See 844 F. Supp. at 284. The Assistant United States Attorney argued, over his own 
objection that he was not required to make this defense, that the bank in question was 
"FDIC insured; that the robbery was particularly violent in that the defendant threatened to 
kill certain bank employees; that roughly twenty-five percent of bank robberies in this dis­
trict are tried in Federal court, and those are usually cases like this one which involve vio­
lence; and that the defendant has a violent background." 844 F. Supp. at 284-85 (internal 
citations omitted). 
95. See 844 F. Supp. at 284. 
96. 844 F. Supp. at 285. 
97. 86F.3d 1314 (4th Cir. 1996). 
98. In 1992, Congress federalized the crime of carjacking. See Pub. L. No. 102-519, § 
lOl(a) (codified at 18 U.S.C. A. § 2119 (West Supp. 1998)). 
99. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86F.3d 1314, 1321 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting ad­
ditionally that the use of a firearm and nature of the crime of carjacking itself might also be 
relevant to the federal nature of the case). 
100. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d at 1321. 
101. See 86 F.3d at 1321. That Congress considered this offense to be particularly seri­
ous can be seen in the punishment prescribed for violators of the Act - imprisonment for 
up to fifteen years in circumstances where no one is injured and the provision for the possi­
bility of the death penalty if the carjacking results in the victim's death. See 86 F.3d at 1321. 
The court also found relevant the legislative history of the carjacking statute, which dis­
cussed the "rash of theft by juveniles" and the "substantial threat [they pose] to public 
safety. " 86 F.3d at 1321 (quoting 138 CONG. REC. S17,961 (1992) (remarks of Sen. Lauten­
berg)). 
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"strong indicators [that] more than a run of the mill federal interest" 
was involved.102 
3. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Some courts have rejected the argument that the JJDPA or the 
statute's legislative history supports judicial review of a prosecutor's 
certification.103 Instead of favoring judicial review, these critics hold 
that based upon traditional notions of prosecutorial discretion, judges 
are not competent to address this question at all.104 It has been the 
longstanding practice of the American criminal justice system to 
commit prosecutorial decisions to the complete discretion of the 
prosecutor.105 The decision about whether to prosecute - the charg­
ing decision - is typically considered to be one of the most prominent 
decisions committed to the prosecutor's discretionary power.106 Some 
courts have considered the certification of a "substantial federal inter­
est" to be a "perfunctory corollary to the decision to prosecute itself," 
and accordingly have held that this decision should be free from judi­
cial oversight.107 This argument reasons that because prosecutors 
make the determination of the existence of a "substantial federal in­
terest" in every case, they alone are competent to conclude that the 
statutory requirements of the certification have been met.108 
Proponents of this viewpoint look to standards outlined by the 
United States Department of Justice for the determination of whether 
a "substantial Federal interest would be served by prosecution,"109 and 
conclude that judges are "ill-equipped" to review the factors upon 
102. 86 F.3d at 1320-21. The application of this reasoning seems to accept the troubling 
rationale that a response to political pressure can be an adequate reason for Congress to 
federalize a crime. Yet this rationale at least provides a principled means for courts to limit 
the expansion of juvenile crime to areas where Congress did not intend federal jurisdiction 
to extend. 
103. For a list of these cases, see supra note 21. 
104. See supra note 21. 
105. Prosecutors have the authority to decide whom to prosecute, for what charge, and 
oftentimes, due to the sentencing guidelines, what sentence to impose. In these areas of 
broad discretion, courts typically do not review the prosecutor's decisions and actions. See 
Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 
736-59 {1996). 
106. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 {1992) (granting discretion over 
the charging decision); Lara Beth Sheer, Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1353-55 
{1998). 
107. United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d 519, 540 (7th Cir. 1998). 
108. See Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 539-40. 
109. United States Dept. of Justice, Attorney's Manual, § 9-27.220 {Sept. 1997) [herein­
after Attorney's Manual]. The Manual states that the determination of a "substantial fed­
eral interest " is integral to every decision whether to prosecute. See id. 
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which prosecutors rely.110 The "substantial federal interest" factors 
listed in the Department of Justice manual are: 
[f]ederal law enforcement priorities; [t]he nature and seriousness of the 
offense; [t]he deterrent effect of prosecution; [t]he person's culpability in 
connection with the offense; [t]he person's history with respect to crimi­
nal activity; [t]he person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or 
prosecution of others; and [t]he probable sentence or other consequences 
if the person is convicted.111 
It is argued that these factors are "administrative in nature, [deter­
mined] after a studied assessment of the Government's policy visions 
and priorities," and that just like a prosecutor's charging decision, this 
decision is ill suited to judicial review.112 The charging decision is 
normally not subject to judicial review because the prosecutor makes 
the determination based on the strength of the evidence and the prob­
able success of a trial on the charge.113 Arguably, these considerations 
may be beyond the expertise of reviewing courts.114 
Yet the ability of courts to review the actions of a prosecutor, 
based upon the Justice Department's standards, is not outside the 
bounds of judicial action. Significantly, even the Department of 
Justice Manual states that United States Attorneys should take great 
care in determining whether a "substantial federal interest" exists un­
der the JJDP A, because the decision will likely be scrutinized and 
challenged.ns Moreover, unlike the considerations that are beyond 
the expertise of reviewing courts, judges routinely consider and review 
the factors that the Department of Justice believes comprise the de­
termination of a "substantial federal interest" in the JJDP A. 
Courts, for instance, often review decisions by prosecutors that in­
corporate the standards set out by the Department of Justice in two 
110. See Elisabeth Alden Bresee, Prosecutorial Discretion, 15 GEO. LJ. 859, 859 n.1045 
(1987) (citing cases supporting the general principle). 
111. Attorney's Manual, supra note 109, at § 9-27.230 (numbers omitted); see also John 
S. Austin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Substantial Assistance: The Power and Authority of 
Judicial Review - United States v. Wade, 15 CAMPBELL L. REV. 263, 284 (1993). 
112 Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 540. 
113. For instance, prosecutors decide to prosecute some defendants but not others 
based on the strength of evidence and the probable success at trial. See Steven D. Qymer, 
Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 10 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 727 (1997). 
114. See Jarrett, 133 F.3d at 540. 
115. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Trying Juveniles in Federal Court, 9 CRIM. JUST., Fall 
1994, at 45. The United States Department of Justice Manual advises U.S. Attorneys to ab­
stain from prosecutions if "[n]o substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution." 
Attorney's Manual, supra note 109, at § 9-27.220. While the fact that the Justice 
Department cautions restraint does not mandate judicial review, it does provide evidence 
that even prosecutors themselves are aware of the possibility of the overzealous pursuit of 
federal prosecutions, thus providing further support for judicial oversight. 
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settings: good faith challenges and transfer proceedings.116 While 
prosecutors' decisions are typically considered to be made in good 
faith, this consideration is only a presumption. When this good faith 
standard is challenged, courts must consider the government's objec­
tive in the prosecution.117 In making this determination, courts have 
traditionally had a role in examining the rationality of a prosecutor's 
charging decision.118 Courts then are in the position of "second­
guessing policy decisions [made by the prosecutor] that play a role in 
[the] charging [decisions]."119 Defendants in a criminal case making a 
good faith, selective prosecution challenge are requesting that the 
government inform the court of the basis for the prosecution to ensure 
that the prosecutor is not improperly charging one defendant over an­
other.120 Similarly, in the juvenile context, the juvenile defendant 
wishes to ensure that the JJDP A's guidelines for assuming federal ju­
risdiction have been met. Thus, judicial review, in addition to pro­
tecting the policy of federal abstention, can temper concerns regarding 
potential prosecutorial misconduct.121 If judges are· not capable of 
countering prosecutorial pressure toward broad interpretations of 
statutes aimed at obtaining more convictions, the statutory require­
ment of a "substantial federal interest" would be "reduced to mere 
surplusage."122 Specifically, such broad interpretations of the JJDPA 
could result in virtually any case involving a violent felony rising to the 
level of a "substantial federal interest."123 
Furthermore, in the context of juveniles, Congress and the judicial 
system have determined that courts are competent to make these 
types of policy determinations. According to the Trial Manual for De-
116. For a discussion of good faith challenges, see infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
For a discussion of transfer proceedings and cases that address juvenile transfers, see supra 
notes 50-53. 
117. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); Daum v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 
342, 343 (1972) (holding that the equal protection strict scrutiny test includes an inquiry into 
whether there are other means by which the government could achieve its objective); 
Clymer, supra note 113, at 728. 
118. See Oymer, supra note 113, at 727 n.350. 
119. Id. at 728. 
120. See generally id.; Heller, supra note 55. 
121. See United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. 280, 283 (E.D. Va. 1994) (noting 
that the court had "grave concerns that the case was certified for reasons other than those 
articulated by the Government at the hearing"). 
122. United States v. Male Juvenile, 844 F. Supp. at 284. 
123. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1127, 1139-40 & n.66 (1997) (discussing the Department of Justice's belief that its at­
torneys will exercise discretion in prosecuting federal crimes and the failure of this policy, 
particularly as demonstrated by the repeated attempts by prosecutors to circumvent the 
mailing element in mail fraud cases). 
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fense Attorneys in Juvenile Cases ,124 when a juvenile is being trans­
ferred to criminal court, courts typically review both the juvenile's past 
record and the seriousness of the offense - two factors that are also 
part of the determination of whether a "substantial federal interest" 
exists.125 If courts are capable of reviewing these factors when a juve­
nile is transferred, they are also competent to review the certification 
for these same factors in the decision to assume federal jurisdiction. 
Yet these policy decisions are the very ones that many claim are "par­
ticularly ill-suited to judicial review."126 
Despite this evidence that courts have the competence to review 
the factors that prosecutors use to determine whether a "substantial 
federal interest" exists in the prosecution, some commentators have 
argued that judicial review should be limited only to constitutional set­
tings.127 Although review of the prosecutor's decisionmaking in fed­
eral adult criminal law occurs under restricted circumstances, the re­
mainder of this Note will argue that the strong deference to federal 
abstention and the acceptance of separate procedural protections for 
juveniles merit an extension of the ability to review prosecutorial deci­
sions in the certification process. 
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS JUSTIFYING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Congress has repeatedly stated that "[t]he United States has a long 
tradition of dealing differently with juveniles than with adults . . .  in 
the hope that juveniles can be rechannelled into becoming law abiding 
citizens."128 Children are not simply young adults; accordingly, the law 
has developed different procedures and rules that recognize the 
unique circumstances that surround childhood. Because of society's 
special treatment of children, the usual deference given to prosecutors 
should not extend to the juvenile delinquency context. In the 
Gutierrez de Martinez case, the Court relied heavily on policy con-
124. RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATIORNEYS IN JUVENILE 
CASES {1991). 
125. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 124, at § 13.11; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West 
Supp. 1998); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 {1961) (asserting that the factors for 
review of a transfer decision should include the seriousness of the offense, the prosecutorial 
merit or the likelihood of indictment, and whether the client is amenable to treatment). 
126. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 {1985); see also United States v. Juvenile 
Male J.AJ., 134 F.3d 905, 909 {8th Cir. 1998) {holding that the charging decisions involve 
criteria that are "precisely the sort of policy judgments invested in the executive, not the ju­
dicial, branch of government" (citations omitted)). 
127. See Oymer, supra note 113 (noting that the charging decision is limited by the con­
stitutional protections of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses). 
128. S. REP. No. 93-1011, at 6 {1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5283, 5290 (quot­
ing NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, 
CORRECTIONS 247 {1973)). 
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cems in its decision to permit judicial review.129 With regard to the 
JJDP A, there are equally important policy concerns that militate 
against a finding that judicial review should be prohibited.130 Such 
policy considerations are an appropriate basis for permitting judicial 
review. 
This Part argues that these policy considerations - which include 
the importance that society places on the proper treatment of children 
and the need for an appropriate forum to meet children's needs -
mandate that courts should have the opportunity to review a prosecu­
tor's certification in these cases. Section II.A argues that the law's 
separate and different treatment of children and adults provides a jus­
tification for judicial review of certifications under the JJDP A. Sec­
tion II.B then argues that the goals of the juvenile court system and 
the current societal conception of the child cannot be respected by 
transforming the federal district court into a juvenile court. This Part 
concludes that the federal government should abstain from assuming 
jurisdiction in juvenile delinquency proceedings unless a sufficiently 
important federal interest is implicated. 
A. The Status of the Child 
The different treatment of children has an extensive historical 
foundation. At least as far back as the seventh century, society ac­
cepted that criminal law should treat juveniles differently than 
adults.131 Philosophers such as John Stuart Mill recognized an age 
before which individuals are not capable of making rational decisions 
about their own actions.132 These philosophers introduced the notion 
that until children possess the maturity and rationality of adults, the 
law should treat them differently to enable them to become produc­
tive members of adult society.133 American society has adopted these 
129. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text 
130. See United States v. Juvenile Male #1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1319-20 (4th Cir. 1996) 
("[O]ther perhaps weightier considerations . . .  militate against finding that . . .  judicial re­
view has been overcome in the juvenile justice arena." (internal quotations and citations 
omitted)). 
131. King Ine's proscription against stealing sets the age of majority at ten: "If any one 
steal, so that his wife and his children know it not, let him pay LX . . .  A boy of X years may 
be privy to a theft . . . ." CHARLEs H. SmREMAN & FREDERIC G. REAMER, 
REHABILITATING JUVENILE JUSTICE 3 (1986) (quoting WILEY B. SANDERS, JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS FOR A THOUSAND YEARS: SELECTED READINGS FROM ANGLO SAXON TlMES 
TO 1900 (1970)). While King Ine declared a ten-year- old to be capable of criminal activity, 
it is important to remember that the JJDPA defines a juvenile as a person under eighteen 
years of age. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998). 
132 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Pub­
lishing Co., Inc. 1978); see also SmREMAN & REAMER, supra note 131, at 4 (discussing phi­
losophies of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill). 
133. See SmREMAN & REAMER, supra note 131, at 4. 
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principles by applying different legal rules and principles in the rela­
tionships between children and both the state and their families.134 
Within each of these settings, the law presumes that a child is incapa­
ble of voicing a rational preference and therefore substitutes another's 
articulation of the child's interests.135 
Within the law of the family, parents have constitutional rights to 
direct the upbringing and care of their children.136 The Supreme Court 
has held that the state can infringe upon this constitutional right only 
in the most extreme settings.137 Under this deferential standard, par­
ents have the right, for example, to punish their children physically,138 
direct the medical treatment their children may receive,139 and to vol­
untarily commit their children to a mental institution.140 
134. These settings involve a combination of both state and federal law. The majority of 
laws that address a child's relationship to his family are governed by state law, such as di­
vorce, child custody, and abuse and neglect proceedings. Federal law also makes significant 
contributions to the understanding that the law should apply differently to children. See in­
fra notes 136-148 and accompanying text. 
135. There has been much scholarly research and debate about the ability and appropri· 
ateness of substituting a child's voice with that of either a parent or the state. Instead of as­
suming that a child's voice can be adequately voiced through other means, many scholars 
have recommended a new standard where children's voices are recognized for their unique­
ness. See, e.g., Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Per­
spectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 12 (1994). The law can be said to "presume" 
that a child is incapable of vqicing a rational preference, because some children will not be 
immature but will still be accorded this status. For instance, a child could have significant 
experience and expertise in dealing with money and contracts and still be able to void a con­
tract on the basis of his age, while an adult without such experience would not be accorded 
the same protection. 
136. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971) (permitting parents to direct the edu­
cational upbringing of their children); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) 
("[W]e think it entirely plain that the [statute in question] interferes with the liberty of par­
ents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."). 
137. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that clear and convinc­
ing evidence is required to terminate one's parental rights). 
138. See Fitzgerald, supra note 135, at 37-38. 
139. See, e.g., Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 (Del. 1991) (permitting parents to 
reject a chemotherapy treatment for their child); In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009 (N.Y. 
1979) (permitting parents to choose nutritional therapy for their child's Hodgkin's disease, 
despite the recommendations of the child's physicians). But see People v. Rippberger, 231 
Cal. App. 3d 1667 (Ct. App. 1991). 
140. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (upholding a statute that permitted the in· 
stitutionalization of a child without an adversary hearing); see also Lois Weithom, Mental 
Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 773, 788-91 (1988) (discussing how most juveniles admitted to psychiatric fa. 
cilities have problems associated with normal development, not severe or acute mental ill­
ness). These standards are in stark contrast to laws that prohibit assault against adults and 
commitment laws that require a person to be a threat to themselves or others before they 
can be involuntarily instiqitionalized. Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-335 et seq. (1998) 
with § 16.1-345(1) (comparing Virginia statutes for commitment of adults and minors). 
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It is not only in these intra-family settings that family law has 
treated children differently than adults.141 Children are not permitted 
to appear as parties in divorce proceedings that involve decisions on 
their custodial arrangements, nor may they be privy to child support 
hearings.142 Instead, the "best interest" standard has developed to 
substitute the state's voice as a proxy for the child's.143 Because chil­
dren are not treated simply as little adults, the law has developed the 
"best interest" standard to address the unique needs of children.144 
This different treatment extends beyond family law into relations 
between children and the state. Historically in this country, many 
children were subject to the same criminal proceedings and sentences 
as adult criminals were.145 Progressive reformers of the nineteenth 
century saw this undifferentiated treatment as a great injustice to chil­
dren, who were viewed by many as incapable of possessing criminal 
intent and in need of specialized treatment.146 Accordingly, these re­
formers formalized their ideas for a new approach to dealing with 
young offenders in the establishment of the juvenile court system.147 
The juvenile court, thus, "was part of a general movement directed 
141. See Fitzgerald, supra note 135, at 14 (noting that the law "consigns children to the 
private realm of their parents' care and control"). Furthermore, it is interesting to note that 
in certain contexts, such as those involving free speech rights and the ability to petition a 
court for an abortion, children are given standing in legal disputes that are "of keen interest 
to us as adults." Id. at 15. 
142. See Fitzgerald, supra note 135, at 42, 46-47. 
143. The "best interest" standard is utilized in a variety of family law settings, including 
abuse and neglect proceedings, custody disputes, guardianship, and judicial waiver hearings. 
Statues that mandate that decisions be made in the best interests of the child often specify 
the standards by which a judge should make his or her determination. For example, in 
Michigan, the "best interests of the child" standard means the "sum total of the following 
factors [are] to be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court: (a) The love, affec­
tion, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child. (b) The 
capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance 
and continuation of the educating and raising of the child in its religion or creed, if any. (c) 
The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, 
medical care or other remedial care recogni2ed and permitted under the laws of this state in 
place of medical care, and other material needs . • . .  (k) Any other factor considered by the 
court to be relevant to a particular dispute . . . •  " MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 700.424c(5) 
(West 1995 & Supp. 1999). 
144. It is possible to argue that permitting the prosecutor to file an unreviewable certifi­
cation is simply another application of the best interest standard - substitution of the voice 
of the prosecutor for that of the child. This argument is unpersuasive. Unlike the traditional 
best interest standard in which the role of the party whose voice is substituted for that of the 
child is to assist or protect, the role of the prosecutor is to punish and penalize the child. 
145. See Joseph F. Yeckel, Note, Violent Juvenile Offenders: Rethinking Federal Inter­
vention in Juvenile Justice, 51 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 331, 334 (1997). 
146. See SHIREMAN & BEAMER, supra note 131, at 4. 
147. To that end, in 1899, Illinois became the first state to establish a juvenile court. By 
1945, every state had established a juvenile court system. See ANTIIONY M. PLA'IT, THE 
CHILD SAVERS 9 (2d ed. 1977); ROBERT M. MENNELL, THORNS & TlilSTLES: JUVENILE 
DELINQUENTS IN TIIE UNITED STATES 1825-1940, at 132 (1973). 
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toward removing adolescents from the criminal law process and cre­
ating special programs for delinquent, dependent, and neglected chil­
dren. "148 
Today, juvenile courts continue to operate in a procedurally and 
substantively different manner than criminal courts. For example, the 
juvenile court system considers rehabilitation to be its primary goal.149 
The courts recognize that children are fundamentally different from 
adults in their cognitive abilities and their amenability to treatment.150 
While states have instituted more punitive measures for juvenile de­
linquents, which include an increased focus on incarceration as op­
posed to probation, the severity and purpose of sentencing in juvenile 
as opposed to criminal court is still dramatically different.151 Signifi­
cantly, sentences for juveniles normally terminate when a child is no 
longer considered a juvenile, typically at age eighteen or twenty-one. 
Unlike an adult sentence, which does not relate to the age of the of­
fender, a juvenile sentence "recognizes the unique physical, psycho­
logical, and social features of young persons in the definition and ap­
plication of delinquency standards."152 The changes in the juvenile 
court system throughout the states have not altered this central func­
tion of the court.153 These changes recognize that while juveniles are 
148. Id. at lO. 
149. Significantly, researchers have concluded t!Iat rehabilitative treatment - for ex­
ample, community-based interventions - works. The question t!Iat remains is how to de­
velop t!Ie most effective means of providing t!Iese services to children. See Thomas F. 
Geraghty, Justice for Children: How Do We Get There?, BB J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
190, 210 n.43 (1997) (citing a comprehensive directory of treatment services). It is significant 
t!Iat Congress, in permitting t!Ie prosecution of serious, violent juvenile crime, explicitly rec­
ognized t!Iat t!Ie purpose of lB U.S.C. § 5032 was to "preserve t!Ie principles t!Iat criminal 
prosecutions should be reserved for only t!Ie most dangerous juvenile offenders." S. REP. 
No. 9B-225, at 391 (19B4), reprinted in 19B4 U.S.C.C.A.N. 31B2, 3531. This language shows 
t!Iat Congress intended to maintain t!Ie juvenile court's rehabilitative focus, unless t!Ie crime 
is so severe t!Iat t!Ie presumption for rehabilitation is no longer appropriate. 
150. The amenability to treatment was a central component of progressive reformers' 
vision t!Iat delinquency was a condition t!Iat could be cured. See Geraghty, supra note 149, 
at 211-12. 
151. See CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 
31 (199B); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabet!I Cauffman, The Elephant in the Courtroom: A 
Developmental Perspective on the Adjudication of Youthful Offenders, 6 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y 
& L. 3B9, 396 n.4 (1999). Furt!Iermore, t!Ie Supreme Court has recognized t!Iat t!Ie juvenile 
delinquency proceeding is not a criminal proceeding. See In re Gault, 3B7 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) 
(describing delinquency hearing as "civil" in nature). 
152. Elizabet!I S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Develop­
mental Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, SB J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 146 n.39 
(1997) (quoting INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE 
STANDARDS, Standards Relating to Dispositions, 1.1, commentary at 3, (19B2) [hereinafter 
ABA STANDARDS]). Juvenile sentencing should also reflect t!Ie "slow process of intellec­
tual and emotional maturation during adolescence." Id. (citing ABA STANDARDS, supra, at 
1.1, commentary at 19). 
153. The increase in t!Ie use of punitive measures against juvenile offenders has oc­
curred as many have questioned t!Ie continued need for a separate juvenile court. States 
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responsible and blameworthy for their actions, it is unrealistic to treat 
them as if they are fully mature individuals capable of rational adult 
decisionmaking.154 Accordingly, states have lowered the age at which 
a child is presumed capable of making rational decisions and therefore 
subject to criminal prosecutions.155 These individuals are then re­
moved from the juvenile court and transferred to adult criminal pro­
ceedings.156 While the juvenile justice legislation has stated that 
younger children can face criminal prosecution, the juvenile court re­
mains the forum where children's interests and uniqueness are still 
recognized.157 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized and extended certain 
due process protections to children,158 the law continues to recognize 
the inherent differences between children and adults. For example, 
the federal Constitution does not extend the right to a jury trial to 
children.159 The Supreme Court has justified this different treatment 
on the ground that juries will increase the adversarial nature of the 
proceeding - an aspect that juvenile forums attempt to minimize.160 
have responded to the criticism of the alleged failure of the juvenile courts by easing the 
standards for the transfer of children from juvenile to criminal court. Commentators sup­
porting this view claim that the juvenile court was not established nor equipped to deal with 
violent juvenile crime. The societal view is that juveniles who commit violent crime are not 
capable of rehabilitation. See Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, 
Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CruMINOLOGY 68 (1997). 
As the concern about the rising rate of juvenile crime and the possible inability of rehabilita­
tive intervention to succeed has increased, some states have responded by adopting blended 
sentencing schemes that permit juvenile court judges to impose both juvenile and adult sen­
tences at the same time. After a child has been given rehabilitative intervention, the court 
can determine how the child has responded and whether the adult sentence needs to be im­
posed. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 191 n.3 (citing PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE 
REsPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 55-56 (1996) ). 
154. See Scott & Grisso, supra note 152, at 146. 
155. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §  15-11-5 (1999) (providing for transfer at age thirteen). 
156. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998) (discussing transfer provision). 
157. See Geraghty, supra note 149; Scott & Grisso, supra note 152; Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Youth Crime and What Not to Do About It, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 435 (1997). Fur­
thermore, while the JJDPA provides for transfer of juveniles to adult court, the fact that a 
judge must make a determination that a criminal court is the appropriate forum is another 
example of the law's different treatment of juveniles. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032. The law obvi­
ously does not provide a similar hearing for adults to determine whether they should be tried 
in a criminal court. 
158. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970) (providing for "beyond a reason­
able doubt" standard in delinquency prosecutions); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (pro­
viding right to counsel, notice of charges, cross-examination and confrontation, and privilege 
against self-incrimination); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (holding that 
children are not entitled to bail or indictment by grand jury). 
159. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
160. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 223-24 (discussing that jury trials do not take into 
account the special needs of children and that children have little comprehension of the pro­
cess). 
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Although the presumption of prosecutorial discretion is fairly well 
entrenched in the adult criminal system, the legal system's different 
treatment of children provides compelling reasons to deviate from that 
standard.161 Importantly, in the federal system, all felony defendants 
are afforded the constitutional protection of a grand jury indictment.162 
Accordingly, the independent review over the charging decision is ac­
complished in an adult proceeding by the grand jury indictment.163 
Federal prosecutors, however, proceed against children by informa­
tion.164 While it may be somewhat duplicative to provide for judicial 
review of a charging decision against an adult defendant, the lack of a 
comparable check upon the federal prosecutor in a juvenile proceed­
ing is glaring.165 
This lack of protection is even more significant given the ability of 
prosecutors to transfer a juvenile to adult status.166 Children who are 
transferred to adult status would thus be treated more harshly than 
adult defendants who are given the protections of the grand jury in­
dictment requirement. This lack of protection is significant because 
federal prosecutors attempt to try most children brought to federal 
court as adults.167 Therefore, the lack of important protections for ju­
veniles in the federal system should permit judicial review of the 
prosecutor's certification in order to protect children from potential 
abuse by the justice system. 
This special relationship between children and the state supports 
the continued existence of the juvenile court system and the different 
treatment of children from adult offenders.168 Because the purpose 
and structure of the juvenile justice system differs from the adult sys-
161. See supra Section II.A. 
162 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Robert Johnston et al., Procedural Issues, 36 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 983, 985-86 & n.8 (1999). 
163. See Johnston et al., supra note 162, at 985-86. 
164. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998). 
165. While there is much current debate about the value of the grand jury system to pro­
tect the interests of defendants, the federal government, as opposed to many state govern­
ments, has not shed its requirement of prosecution by indictment for felony defendants. Ac­
cordingly, children are being denied the protection of independent review by a grand jury. 
166. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5032 (permitting the transfer of a child as young as age thirteen). 
While the decision to transfer a child to adult status is subject to review, the initial decision 
to bring a child into federal court lnight not be. The factors that establish a substantial fed­
eral interest are different from the criteria for determining whether a child is mature enough 
to be prosecuted as an adult. Therefore, review of the transfer decision is not sufficient pro­
tection. 
167. It appears that most children brought to federal court are tried as adults. Only 200 
or so juveniles are tried in federal court each year. Most of these children are Native 
Americans. Because many federal prosecutions are politically motivated attempts to obtain 
higher sentences, the majority of federal prosecutors attempt to try children as adults. See 
Scalia, supra note 74, at 3; see also ABA Report, supra note 4, at 15. 
168. See supra note 153 (challenging this prelnise ). 
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tern, different.protections and procedures are required.169 The differ­
ent status of children in their relationship to the state serves as an im­
portant policy justification for judicial review. Just as policy played an 
important role in the Gutierrez de Martinez Court's decision to permit 
judicial review, this policy rationale justifies different procedural rules 
for children and a potentially broader role for judicial review in the 
juvenile context.170 
B. The Benefits of the Juvenile Court Cannot Be Recreated in an 
Infrequently Used Federal District Court 
An additional policy reason justifying judicial review of the prose­
cutor's certification under the JJDPA is that federal courts are une­
quipped to capably handle juvenile delinquency cases.171 Tradition­
ally, law enforcement and specifically the adjudication of delinquency 
have been state functions.172 Over the past thirty years, however, the 
federal government has created an increasing number of new federal 
crimes, many of which overlap with state prosecution of similar activ­
ity.173 Until the latter part of this century, federal crimes were limited 
primarily to crimes that had a distinct federal interest.174 The majority 
of other criminal offenses were prosecuted by local officials in the 
state courts. This separation of functions was important because crime 
was understood as primarily a local concern, where communities 
would determine the criminal law in connection with local customs 
and interests. Many commentators have challenged the value of cre­
ating federal jurisdiction in an area of traditional state control.175 This 
Section argues that the rampant nature of the federalization of crime 
does a significant disservice to children, particularly in the adjudica-
169. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). 
170. See Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting 
Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254, 1257 (1996). 
171. It is important to remember that in the context of the JJDP A, the United States 
District Court is transformed into a juvenile courtroom, whose function is to operate proce­
durally and substantively as a juvenile court. 
172. See MARION, supra note 5, at8. 
17 3. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
174. Federal offenses were typically limited to "treason, bribery of federal officials, 
perjury in federal court, theft of government property, and revenue fraud. " Sara Sun Beale, 
Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 54 3 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL & Soc. SCI. 39, 40 (1996). Furthermore, many commentators initially questioned the 
very ability of the federal government to assume jurisdiction over common law crimes. See 2 
George L. Haskins & Herbert A. Johnson, HlsTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 6 3 3-4 3 (1971); Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 
38 HARV. L. REV. 545, 546-48 (1925). 
175. See, e.g., Chief Justice Raises Concerns on Federalism, THE THIRD BRANCH 
( Administrative Office of the United States Courts), Jun. 1998, at 1-2; A B A  Report, supra 
note 4, at 26; Clymer, supra note 11 3, at 645-46. 
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tion of juvenile delinquency. Moreover, important policy considera­
tions, which establish that state courts are the best forum to address 
the unique needs of juvenile respondents, provide the same support 
for judicial review that other policy rationales did for the Court in 
Gutierrez de Martinez.176 
As previously noted, Congress has expanded the types of crimes 
that can be prosecuted in federal court. It is questionable, however, 
whether these new laws will address the problem they were designed 
to solve. First, due to the limited amount of resources and reach of 
federal law enforcement, federal criminal law will have a limited im­
pact upon the conduct that Congress seeks to regulate. As a report 
issued by the American Bar Association noted, it is unlikely that the 
federalization trend will have any appreciable effect on crime without 
a significant infusion of money.177 Accordingly, the rising trend of ju­
venile crime, which Congress cited as a primary factor behind the en­
actment of the JJDP A, is unlikely to be addressed by trying juveniles 
in federal court.178 Second, the enactment of a federal criminal statute 
may give the false impression of greater crime control and that ade­
quate resources have been applied to the problem. This impression 
could disrupt the funding of state criminal processes that are not tied 
to federal enforcement.179 Because state juvenile courts and treatment 
programs already receive less funding than their adult counterparts, 
the false impression of greater crime control could lead to fewer re­
sources being directed to the state juvenile delinquency system.180 
176. For a discussion of the Gutierrez de Martinez decision and the policy considerations 
supporting it, see supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text. 
177. See ABA Report, supra note 4, at 18-19 (noting that no effect will be likely without 
a "massive (and unlikely) infusion of federal money" and that police executives have stated 
that it is "unrealistic to expect that federal authorities will have the resources and inclination 
to investigate and prosecute traditionally state and local offenses"). This report also notes 
that federal prosecution of domestic drug trafficking, the largest segment of federal prosecu­
tions, amounts for only two percent of all prosecutions in the nation. See ABA Report, su­
pra note 4, at 20. 
178. It is possible to argue that many of the federal crimes that have been enacted are in 
direct response to political pressure to address rising crime rates. Thus, federal interests 
have been determined on the basis of a crime's seriousness and the level of public concern, 
rather than its connection to a substantial federal interest in the prosecution. See ABA Re­
port, supra note 4, at 15. While passing legislation may address immediate public pressure 
for a direct response to a particular incident, the enactment of a federal criminal code will 
not solve the crime problem and may exacerbate the effect. For a discussion of the legisla­
tive history of the JJDPA, see supra Section I.B. 
179. See ABA Report, supra note 4, at 21 (noting that two highly publicized federal 
statutes enacted in 1994 - involving drive-by shootings and interstate domestic violence, 
were not cited in a single prosecution in 1997). Furthermore, the prosecution of crimes at 
the federal level may have the concurrent effect of decreasing the stature of the state crimi­
nal justice system that remains the primary body addressing criminal law in American soci­
ety. 
180. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at218 & n.67. 
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Finally, the federalization of crime that is duplicative of state and 
local prosecutions places significant burdens on an already over­
whelmed federal system.181 The increase in federal criminal proceed­
ings reduces the time that federal judges can allocate to the traditional 
functions of the federal judiciary.182 The Judicial Conference of the 
United States has noted that the federalization trend will "negatively 
impact on the ability of the federal courts to hear federal criminal 
prosecutions, as well as carry out vital civil responsibilities in a timely 
manner."183 
In addition to these concerns with the federalization of crime gen­
erally, two important differences between the federal and state system 
make federal adjudication of juvenile delinquency both unwise and 
harmful to the goals of the juvenile justice system: (1) federal judges 
and other court officials lack the experience to work with juvenile of­
fenders, and (2) the federal government does not have the programs 
or facilities to address the needs of juvenile offenders. 
First, as opposed to federal judges, prosecutors, and defense coun­
sel, who may not even have one federal juvenile case each year,184 state 
court officials have well-developed experience in the most effective 
ways to deal with children themselves and the unique rules and cus­
toms of a juvenile proceeding.185 The state juvenile court is organized 
181. See generally AB A  Report, supra note 4. 
182. See id. Furthermore, it is important to note that the burden of additional federal 
crimes also impacts the enforcement and treatment of offenders. Probation officers and so­
cial workers are of great importance in the juvenile system. In fact, most juvenile probation 
officers have lighter caseloads so they can put more time and effort into these cases. See 
Geraghty, supra note 149, at 228. 
183. A B A  Report, supra note 4, at 36 & n.62, (quoting September 1992 Report of the 
Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 57); see also Chief Justice 
Rehnquist Raises Concerns on Federalism, supra note 175, at 1-2. 
Additionally, it is significant that federal criminal cases generally are given scheduling 
priority over civil cases (whether between an individual and the government, or between 
individuals). Finally, it should also be noted that some commentators have opined that the 
reduction in time for traditional federal judicial functions may have the effect of eroding the 
quality and distinctiveness of the federal judiciary, as either more judges are added or judges 
cannot adequately and capably handle the judicial tasks before them. See A B A  Report, su­
pra note 4, at 35-39. 
184. While only 150 to 200 children are tried as juveniles each year in federal court, the 
certification issue is critical for two reasons. First, as is described in this Section, even for 
these 200 children, state courts continue to be the best forum to address their interest. Sec­
ond, the certification requirement is the first step to the prosecution of children as adults in 
federal court. Each year, approximately 60 to 70 children are transferred to criminal court 
once the certification of a substantial federal interest has been accepted. See Scalia, supra 
note 74, at 1. 
185. Juvenile delinquency proceedings have different procedural rules than criminal 
trials. See 18 U. S. C. A. § 5032 (West Supp. 1998). For example, there are complicated rules 
regarding the confidentiality of the proceedings. Questions such as these, which would be 
commonplace in a state court, could occupy a significant portion of a federal trial. The ex­
tension of the trial for these reasons does not serve the interests of the court, the public, or 
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around the concept that children are fundamentally different from 
adults and therefore focuses on the unique problems associated with 
the adjudication of children.186 Juvenile courts are flexible systems 
that permit judges to take creative steps to lessen the trauma that sim­
ply appearing in court may cause a child.187 The juvenile court is a 
place where the aggressiveness of the adult criminal court should be 
kept to a minimum.188 Thus, it is more likely that the participants in a 
state juvenile proceeding will be committed to outcomes that focus on 
the best interests of the child involved.189 Juvenile court judges, due to 
their experience with children, have the ability and knowledge to 
modify trials to take into account the needs of children and to control 
attorneys from deviating from the court's specialized purpose.190 In 
the few cases they will ever hear, however, federal officials will not re­
ceive the training or experience they need to sensitize themselves to 
the unique needs of children in delinquency proceedings. Further­
more, scant federal prosecutorial and judicial resources are wasted 
when these actors must gain expertise in this different trial proce­
dure.191 
The lack of experience of court officials can also have a significant 
impact upon the success of the disposition or rehabilitation. As op­
posed to criminal courts, where sentences are based upon statutory 
guidelines, dispositions in juvenile court are based upon the particular 
needs of the individual child.192 States typically do not have formulas 
for sentencing juveniles and instead grant discretion to the trial judge 
to adopt an appropriate disposition.193 While the JJDPA also grants 
the child. The inefficient use of resources is only compounded when the availability of the 
state juvenile court is considered. 
186. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 206; Scott & Grisso, supra note 152, at 139 ("Mod­
em developmental psychology provides substantial, if indirect, evidence that adolescent 
choices about involvement in crime and their decisions as defendants in the legal process 
reflect cognitive and psychosocial immaturity."). 
187. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 224. The flexibility of the juvenile court system 
has long historical roots. See SIDREMAN & REAMER, supra note 131, at 6 (quoting from the 
first juvenile court judge in Illinois as to how he, as a juvenile court judge, acts differently 
toward children). 
188. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 224. 
189. See id. at 223-26 (arguing that because the participants in the juvenile court under­
stand the cognitive differences between children and adults, they will incorporate this phi­
losophy into their trial practice). 
190. A judge could keep a prosecutor from overzealously cross-examining a child wit­
ness or from moving the proceeding away from its rehabilitative focus. Furthermore, in 
states that permit jury trials, the judge could adopt "flexible" systems that could minimize 
the impact of a jury upon a child's courtroom experience. See id. at 224-25. 
191. See supra notes 177-183 and accompanying text. 
192. See HERTZ ET AL., supra note 124, at § 38.01. 
193. Unlike criminal court, where sentencing is based upon the crime for which one is 
convicted, juvenile court sentences are based upon the needs of the child. If a child does not 
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this discretion to the trial judge,194 it is unlikely that a federal judge will 
have the interdisciplinary connections that are necessary to address 
the special needs of the child.195 Furthermore, the United States Sen­
tencing Guidelines, which were not drafted with children in mind, re­
strict the discretion of the court.196 Thus, without the experience of 
daily work with children and the interdisciplinary connections that are 
developed through this work, the federal court is unable to achieve a 
child-centered focus as successfully as have state juvenile courts. 
Second, the lack of involvement of the federal government in the 
treatment of juveniles impedes its ability to assist in achieving the 
goals of the juvenile delinquency system. The states have traditionally 
been the administrative body that has dealt with juvenile crime.197 Be­
cause the goal of these proceedings is to help the juvenile re-enter so­
ciety, 198 juvenile courts need to be connected with services and pro­
grams that can achieve this purpose. The federal system is not 
equipped to address the needs of juvenile offenders.199 The federal 
government does not offer the treatment programs and services that 
juveniles require.200 Instead, these programs, which include both resi­
dential and nonresidential programs, are located and operated in the 
communities where juveniles live. State juvenile court officials know 
the programs that are successful in these communities because they 
refer juveniles there every day. In fact, the federal government does 
not even operate a residential treatment facility for juvenile offenders 
or employ juvenile probation or parole officers or attorneys (either 
prosecutors or defense attorneys) with specific experience in repre­
senting juvenile clients.201 
require treatment, a sentence may not be imposed. Even for serious crimes, a juvenile court 
can typically dismiss the delinquency finding, concluding that the respondent does not re­
quire treatment. See id. at § 38.03(a). 
194. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 5037 (West Supp. 1998). 
195. These interdisciplinary connections can include, for example, relationships with 
social workers, community-based delinquency programs, and child psychologists. See Scott 
& Grisso, supra note 152, at 181-89. Because the juvenile justice system is child-focused, a 
close analysis of the causes of delinquency and the potential for constructive intervention is 
required. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 210-11. 
196. Significantly, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines "take no account of adolesr..ent 
development." ABA Report, supra note 4, at 11 n.17. These are features which are central 
to the rehabilitative sentencing function of a juvenile court and which, according to 
Congress, are still important and primary goals of delinquency prosecutions in the federal 
system. 
197. Since crime was not originally thought of as a federal issue, states had the adminis-
trative responsibility to deal with the criminal problems within their borders. 
198. See Geraghty, supra note 149, at 198-201. 
199. See ABA Report, supra note 4, at 11 n.17. 
200. See id. 
201. See id. While it is true that state officials may not be specifically trained, the value 
of experience in working with children cannot be overstated. 
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As in Gutierrez de Martinez, important policy reasons exist to 
permit judicial review that will ensure the accuracy of the prosecutor's 
certifi�ation. In juvenile cases, society's concern with the upbringing 
of children provides such a basis for judicial review. Although it is 
widely understood that there is no easy answer to juvenile delinquency 
and the problems of juvenile crime, states have the procedural and 
substantive experience to address the complexities of the problem. As 
noted by the American Bar Association, the increasing federalization 
of juvenile crime has "no obvious benefit"202 and may, in fact, have the 
effect of frustrating one of the original reasons for the passage of the 
JJDPA - to encourage and enable the states to experiment with dif­
ferent types of programs that work with juveniles.203 The federal gov­
ernment, and specifically the federal district court, has less of a chance 
to accomplish the specific goals of the juvenile delinquency system. 
By providing for review over the jurisdictional provision of the 
JJDPA, Congress recognized that the adverse consequences that come 
with federal prosecution of children militate against increasing federal 
prosecutions. Accordingly, there are persuasive reasons for courts to 
review the prosecutor's certification to ensure that only truly signifi­
cant federal interests will outweigh these important policy rationales. 
CONCLUSION 
While the grounds for federal jurisdiction are present and continu­
ously expanding, Congress has reiterated its position that in these mat­
ters, the federal government should defer to the states. A court has a 
responsibility to ensure that its jurisdiction has been properly invoked. 
Under the procedure established in Gutierrez de Martinez, a court can 
review a prosecutor's certification to ensure substantive compliance 
with the jurisdictional requirements. Congress, through the legislative 
history of the JJDPA, has provided the courts with manageable and 
workable standards, and it is the role of the judicial system to ensure 
that this deference is upheld. 
As long as the judicial system continues to apply different proce­
dural rules to children, the state, given its unique interest in the rear­
ing and proper treatment of children, should ensure that the most ap­
propriate forum for addressing children's needs is found. The 
overwhelming evidence is that in the arena of law enforcement gener­
ally and juvenile crime specifically, the state system is the appropriate 
venue. Because the treatment of a child will differ significantly based 
upon the certification decision, courts must ensure that there is in fact 
202 Id. at 11 n.17. 
203. See supra Section I.B; supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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a "substantial federal interest," thus justifying the creation of a poor 
substitute for the juvenile court at the federal level. 
